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Showing posts with label Volleyball Coaching Life. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Volleyball Coaching Life. Show all posts

Saturday, November 25, 2023

Volleyball Coaching Life-Selection Process for the NCAA Tournament

Everyone becomes expert prognosticators when it comes to guessing which teams will make it into the 64 teams selected for the 2023 NCAA tournament. I am but one of many.

Below is the selection process from what I can recall off the top of my head. Some of the knowledge was related to me quite a few years ago by someone who was the chair of the selection committee that particular year. The details may have changed over the years, but I believe the process is the same. I apologize for any errors.

The selection committee must follow a process to figure out the final 64, the process imposes significant constraints on the decisions.

·       Only 16 teams are seeded instead of all 64 teams. I had hoped that they would start seeding more teams after they seeded all 48 teams during COVID, but they didn’t.

·       The top 16 teams have the option to host the first two rounds, the finals are in Tampa Bay and the regional finals, the third and fourth rounds, had been selected at the time as the finals. The right to host is subject to the NCAA’s guidelines on hosting regarding the quality of the facilities etc. Lockers for all the teams, lockers for the officials, etc. A top 16 seed could choose to not host, but that is crazy talk or they had constraints that they couldn’t overcome.

·       There are 32 automatic qualifiers, conference champions who have won the right to represent their conferences. The top teams in the field who won their conference also counts as the automatic qualifier for the conference.

·       The other teams are considered at large bids.

The RPI is the starting basis of the discussions. RPI is very controversial, and it proven to be not indicative of the strength of the teams since it purely depends on numerical data and it is an average of numerous factors. From Wikipedia:

The rating percentage index, commonly known as the RPI, is a quantity used to rank sports teams based upon a team's wins and losses and its strength of schedule. It is one of the sports rating systems by which NCAA basketballbaseballsoftballhockeysoccerlacrosse, and volleyball teams are ranked. This system was in use from 1981 through 2018 to aid in the selecting and seeding of teams appearing in the NCAA Division I men's basketball tournament as well as in the women's tournament from its inception in 1982 through 2020.

In its current formulation, the index comprises a team's winning percentage (25%), its opponents' winning percentage (50%), and the winning percentage of those opponents' opponents (25%). The opponents' winning percentage and the winning percentage of those opponents' opponents both comprise the strength of schedule (SOS). Thus, the SOS accounts for 75% of the RPI calculation and is 2/3 its opponents' winning percentage and 1/3 its opponents' opponents' winning percentages.

No opinions, no eye tests, strict numbers. Note that the AVCA coaches’ poll is not the starting point, nor is it ever used as reference. The committee does have access to the records of the NCAA regional coaches committee, these committees meet weekly during the season to discuss the teams in that region. This keeps the selection committee up to date on each of the top teams in the region during the season. This is one of the intangible factors that affects the discussions behind closed doors. These are coaches who volunteer their time to give important opinions on the top teams. Since this information does not affect the Coaches polls, they have little to gain personally.

The committee started the selection process Thanksgiving week, I would hazard to guess that they are meeting on Thanksgiving Day too, but I am not sure about that.

The first step is to break the field into four blocks of four. They take the first team on the list and compare their body of work to the second team’s body of work. The term body of work is important and often used in discussions because they are looking at the team’s accomplishment holistically, within the season.

The committee has available to them all the NCAA statistics as well as videos.

·       Head-to-head.

·       Record against top 50.

·       Record against top 25

·       Record against top 10.

·       Significant good wins, against teams ahead of them.

·       Significant bad losses, against teams below them.

·       Set scores, point differentials for good wins and bad losses are also available.

·       Lineups for any matches.

·       Record in the final ten matches of the season.

·       Parenthetically, PABLO was being considered to be used in the selection process, since PABLO was calculated based on predicting the outcome of a head-to-head meeting between two teams, I know the author of PABLO was adjusting the calculations to meet the selection committee’s requirement. I don’t know what became of the attempt to diversify the data set.

Note that the teams’ records that were already baked into the RPI are also included in the statistics used when the committee goes into debating the relative merits of their body of work. At the end of the debate, they decide whether to keep the same order or flip the order of the two teams. The same process goes through all the teams in the four-team block. Then they move to the next block of four, but they take the fifth team and compare their body of work with that of the fourth team, the last team on the first block, to decide on whether to keep the same order or flip. This goes on for all the 16 seeds. They will of course compare the body of work of the 17th team on the RPI and compare them to the last seeded team.

Since they don’t seed all 64 teams, they remove the automatic qualifiers who are not seeded already but are automatically included in the field. They work on the lowest RPI ranked at-large teams to include in the tournament by using the same process. The numbers of the last teams to be considered are different every season. The reason has to do with the way the automatic qualifiers resolve itself and whether the regular season champion or another team won the conference tournament — if they played a conference tournament.  This is why the announcers draw attention to the RPI.

The committee goes deep into the at-large teams, hedging their bets and giving themselves a good selection of backups. This is where the last four in and out come from.

Some good things to keep in mind:

·       While the RPI is the basis of the initial ranking, there are many ways to improve upon where the team ends up in RPI. This is why many coaches opt to schedule tough, reasoning that the 75% of the RPI that is dependent on the Strength Of Schedule (SOS) — opponents’ winning percentage and its opponents' opponents' winning percentages. Teams that are in a weak conference gets hurt by their conference because those wins does nothing to their SOS.

·       There are indirect ways to move up from your RPI, having good upset wins and avoiding bad upset loses.

·       The team’s record in the last 10 matches can be critical for some teams, it inserts a hot team into the tournament, all else being equal, to introduce that potential upset factor.

·       The committee does not look at all the teams from a macro level. As with the NCAA basketball selection, many will fault the selection for some strong early matchups that would be better suited, i.e. more competitive, for the later rounds, but I have to believe that the committee would want to have those later round competitive matches if they had a preference. They are following the rules dictated by the NCAA’s.

The same meetings are held using the same process by the AVCA awards committee to decide on the COY, POY, and the AA teams. The AA teams are further broken down by positions.

This is my favorite part of the season, I hope it is yours too. Enjoy.

 

Thursday, August 17, 2023

Volleyball Coaching Life-The First Day

In the locker room…

There are shrieks of greeting the familiar

There are the silences of greeting the unfamiliar

Music leak from earpods, in sych with the players heartbeats and feeding the butterflies in their stomachs.

Brand new kneepads liberated from the wrappings, knowing that smell will never come back after the first practice.

Socks are put on with care with the memories of long ago blisters.

Hair is tied back into a tight and practical ponytail.

Arm sleeves and wrist bands are placed just so.

Fingers are taped for maximum karma.

Shoes are tied and retied, never reaching the sweet spot between too tight and not tight enough.

Newbies have eyes like saucers, absorbing the new. Fearing the worst, hoping for the best.

Veterans watching the newbies, reading them.

Observing the strength, looking for cracks and the light that inevitably shines through them.

The freshmen taking deep breaths.

The seniors also taking deep breaths.

Both are embarking on a new path.

One anticipating and dreading the first.

One anticipating and dreading the last.

In the gym…

Coaches huddle and debate.

Reviewing the practice plans that have been bled, sweated, and cried over. Its content sear indelibly in their minds.

Plans that started as a thought on a coffee shop napkin and evolved into something with a logic and chronology all its own.

Plans that had extracted a pound of flesh from each coach.

Managers are sweeping the floor for the hundredth time because the previous 99 times were just not good enough.

Nets are tightened to the point of breaking.

Air compressors are whining their distinctive tone, filling each volleyball to a rock-hard consistency.

Pressures are checked and rechecked.

Water stations are filled, complete, and ready.

Silent sentinels for what is to come. Good and bad.

It is the start of the Fall volleyball season, for the tiniest tots to the most seasoned and grizzled collegians, and everyone in between.

No skeptics or cynics are allowed in the gym.

Everyone is 0-0.

Everyone has the chance to go undefeated.

Everyone has the chance to go winless.

And everything in between.

Everyone believes.

Coaches hope for progress and revelation.

Player hope for progress and revelation.

Never mind the drama, the challenges, the practices, the matches, the conflicts.

Always believing in becoming and being the best.

As the players enter the gym…

Some charge in excitedly.

Some saunter in nonchalantly.

Some creep in hesitantly.

Some enter while taking such deep breath that they might pass out.

The sound of chatter is loud, energetic, fearful, hopeful, equanimous, and everything else.

Coaches watch their teams…

They feel their own butterflies grow into Mothra.

“This is it,” they think.

This is us, from now until the end of the season.

We will learn together.

We will suffer together.

We will exult together.

We will love together.

We will bicker together.

We will live and die together.

Coaches watching each other.

Players watching the coaches.

Coaches and players bound together in anticipating and dreading of the unknown.

Then it is time. One coach breaks out of their trance.

The whistle blows…

Friday, July 7, 2023

Volleyball Coaching Life-Synthesis and Analysis

We think about decision making while solving problems as a natural and integral part of what we do when we face a challenge. We don’t, as a rule, decide to separate the decision making into two parts, but I started to categorizing thinking into two parts after I was talked to an expert in my engineering specialty many years ago. He categorized design thinking as synthesis; and what he did as an academic, solving of “Why?” problems, as analysis. As a practicing engineer in industry, I practiced both synthesis and analysis as the problem demanded. I switched between the two modes of work without consciously separating them in my mind, I knew I had to synthesize when I designed and analyze when I had to solve open-ended problems. I worked in one mode or the other without distinguishing one from the other. It wasn’t until it was pointed out that I was performing two different types of decision making that a lightbulb came on.

Synthesis and analysis are the two parts of the integrated whole of thinking in general: the yin and yang of thinking. It is natural to subconsciously switch between the two, depending on the problem and the unknowns.

So why separate the problem-solving process into synthesis and analysis? I believe that it is important we understand how each works separately because the purposes and processes of the two modes are so different and yet are so intertwined it is important to understand them separately, at least in my own conversation with myself. Once we understand each one, we can stitch them back together so that we can understand how they work together in our problem solving.

The advantage with switching quickly and subconsciously between synthesis and analysis is that the two modes are tightly integrated, which makes the process efficient; but our not being consciously aware of our switching between the two modes may lead us into using synthesis when analysis is called for, and vice versa. It forces us to spend more time than is necessary and more importantly, may lead us into the bad habit of thinking in the wrong mode, which may lead us to bad solutions.

When I started thinking about synthesis and analysis, I was thinking primarily about my engineering self; how am I solving problems? Am I being efficient and effective with my cogitations? Inevitably, I digressed and started to extrapolate these ideas and proceeded to apply the synthesis/analysis paradigm to my volleyball thinking process: how do I make decisions as a coach and also imagining how my players would make decisions with synthesis and analysis.

Some definitions:

Synthesis is defined in many ways (Merriam Webster Dictionary n.d.):

·       the composition or combination of parts or elements so as to form a whole

·       the combining of often diverse conceptions into a coherent whole

Similarly, analysis is defined as (Merriam Webster Dictionary n.d.):

·       detailed examination of anything complex in order to understand its nature or to determine its essential features. 

·       a thorough studyseparation of a whole into its component parts

Those that take the known concepts and apply them in an integrated way, making connections between the different defined knowledge bases optimally to create original solutions can be categorized as synthesis. It is the integration of known knowledge to create an original thought that makes the process synthesis, just knowing the necessary knowledge is not synthesis.  

Another way to simply characterize synthesis is to say that it is the feedforward path; where decisions are made to integrate ideas into action, but we need to also understand that we do so without being able to predict the results. Decisions are made based on known knowledge, but it is the situation that is unique. Execution of the synthesized decision leads to an unknown and unpredictable result, making the synthesis an open loop activity.

Synthesis answers the “How?” and “What if?” questions.

Analysis is what happens when the results from the synthesis decisions are compared to what we wanted to result. The comparison of the actual versus the desired outcomes becomes questions: the comparison questions, how close are the actual results to the desired results, assuming that all the variables are measurable, which is a large assumption; the “Why?” questions, why did the results come out the way they did; and the  “How?” question,  how can the next synthesis decision get closer to the desired outcome, that is, “How?” can the initial models be improved so that the synthesis decision that is based on the new improved models get closer to the desired results.

Even as we know that analysis answers the “Why?” questions, we also know that analysis — through answering the “How?” questions —  can also answer some “What if?” questions. The combination of the answers to those questions will allow us to explore ways of predicting outcomes that are based on the improved models that are answers to the “How?” questions.

The simple figure below illustrates the  synthesis/analysis pair as a simple feedback model used in system theory. Synthesis being the feedforward path and analysis being the feedback path. Finding the difference between desired outcome and the analysis of the actual result gives the decision-maker the structure for driving the synthesis decisions.

There are two obvious constraints that need to be considered when extrapolating the synthesis/analysis idea to sports. The first is the time factor: actions happen quickly, in milliseconds, which adds significant stress to the players and coaches during the decision-making process while playing. The second constraint is that of context, there are two distinct but coupled environments that exist in sports: the playing and the practice environments.

Since the first constraint is always present within the second constraint: the speed of the game exerts significant but somewhat different influences in both environments, both constraints are considered together.

The playing environment is where the obvious emphasis should be on executing, i.e.  executing the skills, tactic, strategies, and game knowledge. The added intangible factors are: the player’s ability to deal with pressure, both intrinsic and extrinsic; the player’s ability to apply their training under those conditions; and the team’s ability to adjust to the uncertainties from having multiple independent minds contributing to the ebb and flow of the game action, all executed instantaneously.

The practice environment is where the obvious emphasis should be on learning, i.e., teaching the player’s synapses and neurons to instantaneously execute skills, strategies, tactics, and game knowledge.

My initial thought was to assign synthesis just to the players, just as I had assigned synthesis just to the designers; the players are the ones who must synthesize all their experiences through training and playing.

Accordingly, I had assigned the role of  the analyst to coaches because that was the stereotypical role of the coach, the analyst, the person who evaluates the games as it is played. They create the game plans before the games by applying their knowledge of the game and experience with previous games; after the games, they sort through the statistical data and their intuitive impressions of the games to decide on whether the game was conducted according to their plans.

While comparing the contexts of playing versus training for players and coaches, I realized that the decision-making process for both roles have complex and varying requirements. I also realized that my initial paradigm was too simple: both players and coaches must not only perform both synthesis and analysis, albeit with different ratios of synthesis and analysis tasks depending on the context of the situation, just as the engineer must be able to perform both modes of thinking; the biggest difference is first constraint: decisions are made instantaneously in the playing environment.

In David Epstein’s book Range (Epstein 2019), the following definitions are given to describe the domains under which decision makers need to make their decisions.

Wicked domain: Unclear or incomplete rules.  May not be repeated or obvious patterns. Delayed or inaccurate feedback. Experience may reinforce the wrong response.

Kind domain: Patterns repeat itself. Accurate feedback. Feedback is immediate and accurate.

In conjunction with the environment, Epstein also defined two different modes of thinking that decision makers use to make decisions. Conceptual thinking is the System 2 thinking as defined by Kahneman (Kahneman 2013). It involves dissecting, investigating the problem with fresh observation, and asking the “How?” and “What-if?” questions while creating new ways to look at a problem based on immediate experiences as well as previous experiences and knowledge. Conceptual thinking is a time-consuming but detailed process. Fortunately, it needs to be used to direct us through the wicked environment, unfortunately, the conceptual thinking-based solution usually takes too long for a wicked situation that demands quick response.

Procedural thinking is System 1 thinking as defined by Kahneman. It is where the decision maker bypasses the active consciousness and relies upon our immediate knee jerk reaction. It is our automatic cognitive reaction to any situation. It works by recalling pertinent knowledge on the neuronal level and reacting rather than actively thinking on a brain level. The greatest advantage to procedural thinking is that the solution comes fast. Unfortunately, procedural thinking also presupposes a kind environment, i.e., linear thinking where the solutions are based on scaling known solution, because the linear scaling of a known solution because there is not time to think conceptually.  

Looking at a playing situation, both players and coaches are immersed in a wicked environment, meaning that the first constraint, the speed of the game, drives their decision-making. Instantaneous and procedural solutions that are in a wicked environment, which need to be nonlinear and conceptual in scope. It is these instantaneous requirements that are imposed on the players and coaches that makes the playing context so challenging.

For players, synthesis in the sports context is not strictly thinking as it would be in the engineering context because the player is reacting to the game in front of them, the procedural decision making does not engage the conscious mind, it is the nervous system acting subconsciously and reactively. The first constraint dominates, it is therefore more accurate to define synthesis for the players in the playing environment as simply reacting, because synthesis in the playing environment requires instantaneous recall of previously programed neuronal pathways deriving from playing and training experiences, combined with accumulated knowledge of the sport to make the necessary decisions to not only survive but to overcome the wicked environment. Successful players has internalized and integrated an abundance of  game experiences to make their procedural thinking accurate and recalling appropriate and compatible experiences from the working memory.

There is, however, some time for the player to analyze their situation during a dead ball period, but there isn’t enough time to analyze while the ball is alive; any decision made through analysis is too late.

The coach is also in synthesis while residing in the playing environment, although their decision making the time frame is longer, which allow them to reside in the  analysis mode for longer periods of time, so they do not need to be as reactive as the players. Even so, the ratio of the time that the coach spends in synthesis versus analysis is significantly different for the playing and practice environments.  

Coaches must respond quickly to game situations but must also walk a tightrope between synthesizing and analyzing. Overanalyze and the decisions are made too late; employing faulty and linear extrapolations of their experiences, that is, employing heuristics that do not meet the situational needs results in undesirable outcomes. (https://polymathtobe.blogspot.com/2023/06/volleyball-coaching-life-heuristics.html)

Another factor that coaches must consider is the way that they deliver their instructions to the players while being cognizant of the extrinsic loading effect on the player’s working memory. Coaches need to temper the amount and complexity of their instructions to not distract the players with too much extrinsic loads while also providing the players with essential  instructions during play. This needs to be a conscious decision for coaches to make while they are also extemporaneously delivering the instruction that are the results of their analysis.

Another recently added factor for coaches is the use of statistics in the aftermath of the Moneyball movement. While data collection provides coaches with valuable information that describes the game to consider, the amount of information can also distract and overwhelm. The volume of data that is collected and consumed can easily create a situation of paralysis by analysis. It is impossible to dive into the granularities of the statistical data to arrive at the best answer to a specific situation while in a playing environment. The perspicacious coaches will often use compounded metrics to give them a snapshot of the ongoing match, a heuristic made up of specific data; a good use of heuristics. It is important for coaches to realize that the metrics they use in games are never permanent and have a half-life that lasts only until the next set. Coaches must treat those statistics as instantaneous snapshots of the game which prevents the coach from succumbing to paralysis by analysis, it is by no means an accurate predictor of the future.  It is human nature to extrapolate and project the statistics into the future; that is, inferring and predicting the future based on the description of the present. which will most likely lead to fallacious decisions because the playing situation is dynamic and ever changing.

Another issue with using statistics is as Joe Maddon wrote in his book (Joe Maddon 2022).  As the importance of a given situation rises, the pressure on the decision maker associated with the situation also arises, the uncertainties associated with those metrics also rises; perversely, the size of the data sample available which is associated with the specific situation decreases exponentially. All of this makes an already wicked environment even more wicked. Maddon refuses to rely on dodgy statistics as the situation becomes more wicked.

Transitioning to the practice environment, the best way to deal with the wicked playing environment is to perform analysis offline, making the analysis available for consideration as the situation arises But having the analysis available is not enough, the analysis results must become procedural, integrated in the heuristics of the coaches before the competition because analysis in real time is impossible and failure prone. The ideal is to make the players and coaches make decisions in an antifragile way; that is, to make the procedural, the System 1 responses, be inherently adaptable to the situations as they appear. This is why the practice environment is the yin to the yang of the playing environment.

Antifragility is a property of systems in which they increase in capability to thrive as a result of stressors, shocks, volatility, noise, mistakes, faults, attacks, or failures. (Wikipedia 2023)

Effective practices are critical to effective performances in play, despite Allen Iverson.

Antifragility also means that the system, the team in this case, can make effective decisions under wicked environments while are also adaptive to dynamic conditions of the playing environment. Indeed, an antifragile system means that the team is not only robust and resilient — able to withstand the challenges — but also make immediate decisions that allows the team to gain from the challenges.

The players and coaches prepare to be antifragile in the wicked environment by practicing in a kind environment. This might seem to be an anachronism, but the kind environment slows down the urgency from the playing environment, easing the time pressures for decision making by allowing both players and coaches to have the time to analyze and experiment with the most effective responses. The kind environment is more forgiving and allows both players and coaches to discover the most effective decision by testing — being allowed to make errors — and correcting them offline.

Practicing being antifragile requires both the players and the coaches to flip back and forth between synthesis and analysis modes, much like the engineers. The players are analyzing their execution of physical skills, their reactions to situations, their ability improvise solutions, the validity of their decisions, and their implementation of the tactics prescribed by the coaching staff. Doing this in the kinder environment allows the brain to engage in analysis without incurring costs, that is, losing in competition. As practices evolve in time, the kind environment needs to progress towards being more wicked, the importance of the time element and the competitive pressures all should increase. This becomes the assessment of the players success in integrating the analysis results from practice into their procedural reactions. They must be able continually convert the conceptual into the procedural to make effective decisions in the wicked playing environment. As the players switch between synthesis to analysis, their time spent in synthesis should increase, assuming that there is progress in integrating the analysis results into synthesis.

The players are also connecting the learning from the practice environment to their playing experience and associating the “How?” and “What if?” questions with the newly integrated procedural responses. This is where the uncertainties come in. There is no way to adequately create a practice environment which replicates the wicked playing environment. Add the randomness and pressures which are intimate parts of playing, the results of the synthesis done in practices will also be an open loop, that is, unpredictable. Which is what makes playing the game so challenging .— there is no way of predicting, a priori, the efficacy of the practice until after the assessment through competition.

The practice environment is where the coach must be at their most effective in coaching, because if coaches are at their most effective in practice, the players should be at their most effective in the playing environment, even if randomness disrupts the playing environment the players should be prepared for the randomness by having been trained to be antifragile.

The amount of analysis done by the coaches is not just analysis done in preparation for play: analysis of  the strength and weaknesses of their opponent, analysis of  the strength and weaknesses of their teams, and analysis of possible situational events that may happen when matching up the teams. Preparation for play also means preparation of the learning environment for the players individually, as small groups, and cohesively as a team. Often coaches need to analyze their pedagogical methods for effectiveness. They need to analyze their effectiveness in communicating with each player and staff member; they need to analyze the communications between coaching staff member and player; and they need to analyze the effectiveness of each player’s communications with their teammates. It is diving into the granularities of human interaction and communication and is the key to training the players to be antifragile as they convert the conceptual thinking from analysis in practice into the procedural reaction which  feeds into player synthesis.

On the other hand, the coaches also need to be prepared to synthesize while in the practice environment. They need to create and implement training regimens extemporaneously as the situation demands which best serve the learning needs of the team. They must also integrate the knowledge of the players reactions to adverse situations that are observed in the the practice environment into the coach’s  procedural thinking in order to incorporate those granular details into their decision making in the playing environment.

This exercise started out to clarify the ideas in order to gain an understanding of how synthesis and analysis happens in the engineering and volleyball context. It is a thought experiment undertaken to give the ideas the breadth and depth that I felt necessary. I wanted to explore the ideas in my mind. I wrote it down because I  wanted to be able recall my thought process. I am putting this out because I felt someone might find it interesting.

I hope that you did.

References

Epstein, David. Range, Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World. New York : Riverhead Books., 2019.

Joe Maddon, Tom Verducci. The Book of Joe: Trying Not to Suck at Baseball and Life. New York: Hatchette Book Group, 2022.

Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. NYC: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013.

Merriam Webster Dictionary. n.d. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ (accessed June 28, 2023).

Wikipedia. Antifragility. June 20, 2023. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antifragility (accessed July 6, 2023).

 

 


Tuesday, June 20, 2023

Volleyball Coaching Life- 25:0

There has been a bit of discussion on social media about those teams that have been at both ends of a 25-0 score in the year end tournaments. The discussions brought up a jumble of thoughts and emotions so I thought I would put them down on paper, well, electronic paper, and try to suss out and unjumble my thoughts.

In this era of large convention center tournaments, these kinds of scores should not be happening except for the first day of play, as the way the teams are funneled through pool and bracket play allows teams to settle into a steady state of competitive play the deeper they get into the tournament. Teams are funneled into top and bottom halves with each set of pool play, until they compete with teams that are mostly on the same level of play as themselves  on the last day of competition. Sometimes, an additional day or two of sifting might have been needed, but the idea is that the pains of the early blowouts might be assuaged later in the tournament. I believe the power league idea takes the sifting to a better ending.

One then has to wonder: how did these teams end up in this predicament?  

Some had suggested that it was the fault of the coach and players for not having gotten better over the season. I can’t see how a single set snapshot can represent the season. We all know, or should know, that any score — set or match— has more to do with the matchup at that moment in time between the teams rather than the people involved. Remember that sports are critically dependent on the interaction between two opposing teams.

There are other things to consider as well: the composition of the teams, the relative experience of the players and coaches, the level of the team and club, whether they are a competitive team practicing close to every day in the week or a rec team practicing one or two days a week. To say that it is all the fault of the players and coaches for not being good enough is disingenuous at best and bullying at worst. Players and coaches need time to develop and learn, sometimes these kinds of experiences are necessary for both players and coaches to learn whether it is their passion at that moment, or not.

While I agree that this kind of failure is sobering and perhaps a shot across the bow for the team at the receiving end of the bad news, I wonder how much positive impact is there to this kind of beat down. Some who eschew the participation trophy mentality have jumped on this situation and have said that this is a perfect lesson for all involved. There are many lessons to be learned from failure. While I agree with that, I wonder about the value of the lesson from a 0-25 beat down.

I do have a soft spot for the underdog, I had written many years ago about the worst team. (https://polymathtobe.blogspot.com/2017/03/the-very-worst-team.html). I feel ambiguous pangs of sorrow, of missed opportunities, of a personal need to go tell the players and coaches that things will work out, even though I never actually know if they will or not. I fear that the players and coaches will walk away from my sport after having had a monumentally bad season. Even if this was just a bad set, that this was an anomaly within a relatively successful season, it is traumatic. I think of myself as being the coach of that team, and I ask myself: what would I do? How can I take something this monumental and get in all the lessons that needs to be taught and still not come off pollyannaish and untruthful? It is because I know that the players can be cold-eyed realists that I work at communicating positively without being false and condescending; because I know that as soon as I say something that rings false, I will lose my team. No matter the age of the players, I am not a good liar; and no, I won’t play poker with you.

Many had postulated that it was the coaches and parents who eagerly signed up for divisions of play that are much above the level of the players. That is easy to do, I had written about it before when I spoke of the debate over sandbagging ( https://polymathtobe.blogspot.com/2023/03/volleyball-coaching-life-sandbagging.html). The same principles apply: coaches not knowing how their teams will pan out early in the season, the competitive need to enter the post-season tournaments early to reserve a slot before the tournaments fill, coaches and parents projecting the progress of the teams without any data to support their projections, and unforeseeable injuries or absences to key members of the team.

Sometimes the lower levels of tournaments fill quicker than the upper levels, so the tournament directors give teams and clubs incentive to pay a level up, never realizing, or caring, about the competitive mismatches; just to fill the tournament. On the other hand, despite the clamoring for a means of determining the “true” levels of each team, we in volleyball have never and probably will never develop such a system because we are dealing with the vagaries of human behavior and the unbounded randomness that pervades sports, particularly junior sports.

Are the mismatches becoming more prevalent as the tournaments get bigger? I don’t know and I don’t see any way to decide on a correlation between the growth and number of mismatches, and I don’t care to dig into the minutiae. Additionally, I am not sure this is something we can actually control: too many variables, too much nonlinearity, too many complicating couplings.

This is the part where adults need to be cold-eyed realists. This is also the part that makes the scheduling decisions so fraught with uncertainties. How well will the team compete at the end of the season as compared to the beginning of the season? Coaches will always start the season optimistically: I can improve the players 100-fold, I am that great of a coach. We will play as I command because they will be my little robots and do as I command them. Parents of course will project whatever dreams they have for their off springs, or their own unrequited dreams of sporting prowess. Sunny and bright June and July are so far away when sitting around a table with other parents and coaches in the cold and dreary October and November planning for the season.

The other part of the equation is that coaches and parents have all the best intentions in the world when planning the end of the season. Having an end of the season tournament where players can enjoy the experience in a large tournament seems like a win-win proposition. It is to end in a crescendo. No one should say that a team is not deserving of ending a season with a celebration. Some had said that some of these teams should not travel because they are not good enough to be a “travel” team. I ask them: What is a “travel” team and what is not a “travel” team? Are there strict quantitative limitations that they should follow? Is there a check list? The answer is a resounding NO.

Yet, as adults we should take responsibility for structuring a season as best as we are able given the uncertainties and unknowns. Avoiding a season where we end up demoralizing our players, no matter what age, is imperative. As coaches we need to help our players develop and keep their love of the game that we are passionate about. As parents we need to walk the tightrope of allowing our children to learn from failures while also showing them that there is always a positive side to bad situations.

Losing every match or set in the season does not make for a lot of positive reinforcement. On the other hand, we can prepare all we want but something like that can happen, and we need to be prepared for the conversation.

Getting back to the topic of losing 0-25. It won’t kill them, but at the same time, it may just kill the player’s passion in volleyball, or any sports. We can’t know for sure. But as coaches we need to scaffold our seasons to that we have more bright spots than low spots; those bright spots are not necessarily dependent only on the win/loss record. I would imagine that most players would bury that 0-25 score deep in the recesses of their memory, so much so that they disappear. But we need to be prepared to address it honestly.

I know, very unsatisfying. But at least I had unjumbled it in my mind. Until someone else raises another pertinent point.

 

Thursday, June 15, 2023

Volleyball Coaching Life-Heuristics

In reading Joe Maddon’s Book, The Book of Joe, (Joe Maddon 2022), I was able to gain valuable insight into his rarified world of managing a professional baseball team. As the book had done previously (https://polymathtobe.blogspot.com/2023/06/volleyball-coaching-life-five-levels.html) I started  thinking about a topic that he had brought up while reading Chapter 11:Never Forget the Heartbeat.

My take is my own, I am not trying to put words in Joe Maddon’s voice. I am writing to figure out what I think about the subject. All interpretations and reasoning, as well as errors  are mine unless noted.

heu·​ris·​ticinvolving or serving as an aid to learning, discovery, or problem-solving by experimental and especially trial-and-error methods

·       heuristic techniques

·       heuristic assumption

alsoof or relating to exploratory problem-solving techniques that utilize self-educating techniques (such as the evaluation of feedback) to improve performance.

I have consistently used heuristics throughout my career as an engineer. One reason that people in the STEM world uses heuristics is because heuristics in the sciences are usually buttressed and scaffolded by the natural laws of sciences. Natural constraints have already been woven into the heuristics. The problem with using heuristics to solve problems that are brimming with human interactions is that human decision making is nonlinear and random, which adds an infinite order of complexity to decision making. Using heuristics in a situation that is nonlinear and random could be compared to fitting a square peg in a round hole: the solution may not only be erroneous, but more importantly, it may exacerbate the problem exponentially.

Heuristics can be described as a System 1 response, per Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman 2013). David Epstein would call heuristics a procedural solution to a problem (Epstein 2019). Heuristics are a cognitive shortcut that we use consistently when we are faced with decisions where the there is a dearth of information and time; it is a common situation, we extrapolate what we know, what our experience tells us to shoehorn into the context and situation that exists at that moment in time. Human minds being what they are, we create rule of thumbs, truisms, and simple operational procedures to help make those decisions. In time, the heuristics become inviolate and engrained permanently in our minds; that is, we ignore the context and initial assumptions that make the heuristics true. As Soyer and Hogarth states (Emre Soyer 2020), doing so ignores two critical facts: we usually have both too little information and we have too much information. First, the experiences that we base our heuristics on is true only in that context, in that specific situation, whether it holds true generally for all similar instances is questionable, but in our haste and inability to gain more information, we do what mathematics students are often warned not to do: we extrapolate. We fill in the missing information gap with our imagination, fueled by our fallacies and biases. The convenience of that decision making process seems to justify itself, but more often than not, the decision will turn out to work to the detriment of the decision maker. We justify our choices to satisfy the need to come to a quick decision, we ignore the need to come to an accurate decision. Second, when we are inundated with information, it is natural that our human tendency to use our imagination to create narratives and stories. This is to help us remember the details of the situation, but it also conveniently fit the surfeit of information available to our subconscious mind into a familiar frame; unfortunately, this framing will always be colored with our subconscious beliefs and biases. We will add details to our narrative just to make it fit because we believe it is pertinent even when they are not. Correlation does not equal causality.

Another consideration is that in using heuristics, we are often using a general solution, something that we have cobbled together from numerous experiences into a single heuristic. Contexts are not usually considered when using heuristics. In short, we are using the generic case to solve problems that are specific and demand unique situations; that is part of the attraction of using heuristics, the assumption that good enough is good enough. We assume those pesky details to go away because we don’t have enough time to delve into the granularities.

In the pre-Moneyball era of sports, gutfeel and intuitions were the ingredients that make up  heuristics.  As such, those were the heuristics that statistical analysis was used to dispel. Analytics was the gutfeel and intuition heuristic buster.

In Joe Maddon’s case, he was an early adapter to statistical analysis. He embraced analytics, which was the reason that he was hired as a major league manager.  The analytics departments of the three teams he managed churned out reams of data for him to use. In time, however he came to the realization that analytics is just one tool, one very potent tool, but just A tool to use.

In the short time that Maddon worked as a major league manager, a relatively short tenure when compared with his long tenure working as a coach and a scout, the accepted decision making emphasis  had turned itself on its head. Because of Moneyball, managing became completely about numbers and following the algorithmic routine of processing the number, do what the number says, and never question the numbers. Those who manage had to defend every decision by reciting the all-important analytics.

One phrase that I often use to describe people’s attitudes towards sacred cows is: the biggest and most vocal anti-establishment rebels will often become the biggest new establishment dogmatist after the ancient regime has been overturned. Those who are most passionate about their beliefs have skin in the game, which make them the most vociferous and fierce about their beliefs, so much so that they become as intractable as those who they had deposed.

In many ways they suffer from the sunken-cost fallacy: they have bought into their beliefs that they feel they must not betray their side of the argument that they become zealots.  They will automatically dispense with debate and become just as entrenched and rooted in their heuristics as those they had opposed in the old establishment.  This is what I see in the debate between the analytics proponents and the intuition proponents. Because of this dedication to the sunken cost  fallacy, we have a dichotomous situation that is reflective of the ethos of our society.

Maddon has an interesting, and I believe, sane approach to all this. He thinks that the analytics department is generating too much information, information that is so overwhelming in volume while also containing too much noise. The usual safeguard, in terms of statistical correlation thresholds have been ignored because of the amount of data generated by data mining, ANY correlation is deemed significant. In other words, the decision makers are chasing after noise. His other concern is that in the flood of information, the decision maker must be able to discern quickly, and accurately; which pieces of information are pertinent, and which are extraneous; an impossibility given the minuteness of the time scale and the immensity of the amount of analytic information. Indeed, he wrote in the book that even as he is a proponent of analytics, he wants less information when it comes to crunch time: when the decision maker has the most at stake, or when the situational pressure and stress is at its maximum. He explains the reasons for his preference by pointing out the following: the sample space for the data from high pressure and stress situations are minimal, not enough to meet the statistical significance threshold for decision making; he also believes that people behave differently when under high pressure and stress, therefor any data that is collected will be uncertain, noisy, and not predictive .

He makes the point of saying that he mostly manages with his instincts during the most critical situations because he does not believe that more data is helpful, instead too much data is more detrimental than helpful. This is where he makes an interesting observation. He thinks of his instincts as thinking in advance; that is, the accumulated experiences with different situations, in different contexts, and with different people are all a part of his thinking in advance. I suspect that the thinking that he does prior to a World Series game has been scrubbed of any heuristics from his experience as he is mindful of their presence and the fallacious decision that may result when he employs those heuristics. He states that he prepares for those situations by reviewing the strategy and tactics that are unusual and unexpected, just in case.

The other part of his explanation is that the manager does not and should not operate in a vacuum when it comes to the humanity of his players. Part of his knowledge and experience comes from his interaction and history with his players. He should understand their psychological makeup and he has experienced their lives during the time that they have worked together while under the glare of competition. Maddon emphasizes that he makes a point of knowing and understanding all his players. His “instincts” about the humans that he is working with are worth much more than the reams of soulless data because decision making with data is just data, coaching a team of people is an art. This art is the expression of human instincts when dealing with other humans. Indeed, he makes the eloquent point that analytics and instincts should be used and applied according to the situation and context. Data guides strategy, and the art is belief in the human element, the best solution needs to be both. The magic is in the proportion of each and how they couple and synthesize into new knowledge.

I remember when I was learning about coaching, a wise mentor made a distinct point: we are not coaching volleyball, we are coaching people, volleyball is just the context. That statement has a myriad of meanings. In one instance, it is an admonishment for the coach to remember to treat people as people while coaching; in another instance, it is an admonishment for the coach to trust the human ability to execute the actions and make the decisions no matter the circumstances.

Volleyball Heuristics

This part was actually fun. I thought about some of the heuristics that I had experienced either as a coach or as a spectator. These heuristics are not completely false, nor am I insinuating that these heuristics cannot be true under the correct context and situations. They are heuristics because they have been true under specific circumstances, but they are not true generically.

This is obviously not a definitive list.

In Training

·       Players will always get better when they play more, so just let them play more and never work on fundamentals.

·       Players can only get better by doing an infinite number of identical reps without variation.

·       Beginning players can only get better by doing an infinite number of completely random reps without seeing the same conditions twice.

·       Players should be able to figure out: strategy, tactics, technique, communications, VBIQ without feedback.

·       Drilling with no stated goals is the best way to give players reps.

·       Players should only practice their assigned positions.

o   Liberos and DS should never hit in practice.

o   Middles should never get practice time on setting or passing.

o   Setters should only set.

·       Extended scrimmages starting from zero is good preparation for play.

·       Extended scrimmages with the same scrimmage partner is good preparation for play.

·       Introducing extraneous distractions into drills prepares the players for play.

·       Slapping the ball is a good starting cue to start the rep, especially for hitter timing.

In Competition:

Many of our competition heuristics come from our need to use some statistical measure. Usually, we use intermediate metrics since using the score as a measure is too broad and too final. The problem with using intermediate measures is that we are measuring an action that is only a part of game action. We are diverting our attention from the goal, which is to win at the end of a set or a match. We instead let ourselves get head faked into chasing measures that are merely indicators and never predictors of success. For more on this please see Coach Jim Stones excellent article (https://jimstoneconsulting.com/if-coaches-dont-know-goodharts-law-they-should/) as well as my own explanation: (https://polymathtobe.blogspot.com/2022/07/stats-for-spikes-goodharts-law-and.html)

·       The teams will always win when team passing scores are above 2.5.

·       The correct serving ace to errors ratio hovers around 1.

·       Number of service errors are the best predictors of service aggression.

·       Regression to the mean predicts that the trend will immediately correct itself to the positive result after a string of negative results.

·       A definite and predetermined distribution of sets to hitting positions is necessary for success.

·       Always run middle on a good pass.

·       Always set the pins or backrow on a bad pass.

·       Hitters should only hit their position.

·       Never run a set play off of a dig.

·       Never run a set play out of system.

·       Only run slide plays behind the setter.

·       Setters should tip the ball only on bad passes.

·       Setters should always dump the ball immediately after the opposing team gets a dump kill on your team.

·       Never serve the Libero.

·       Always serve the substitute player that just came in.

·       Serving and passing are the only things that matter in the women’s game.

·       Blocking and hitting are the only things that matter in the men’s game.

·       Defense wins games.

·       Playing against weaker teams helps team confidence.

·       Playing against stronger teams helps team teaches resilience.

In Summary

Every coach has their own heuristic, they are reflections of our beliefs and personal philosophies. They are heuristics because every coach has had some form of success based upon their heuristics. Heuristics only become detrimental to our coaching when we ignore the basis context of how the heuristics became heuristics. There is a time and a place for every heuristic-based decision that we make. If we mindlessly follow our heuristics, we will usually pay the price. We need to challenge every one of our heuristics consistently and constantly. It is even better if we had other coaches challenge them for us, either on or off the court. Professional poker player Annie Dukes, in her book Thinking in Bets (Dukes 2018), talks about having a committee of other poker players who will sit with her and go over every hand that she plays just to avoid all the fallacious thinking that exists. It would be interesting and beneficial to convene a panel of coaches to demythologize all the personal heuristics. Just saying.

References

Dukes, Annie. Thinking in Bets. New York: Penguin, 2018.

Emre Soyer, Robin M. Hogarth. The Myth of Experience: Why we Learn the Wrong Lessons, and Ways to Correct Them. New York: Hatchett Book Group, 2020.

Epstein, David. Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World. New York: Riverhead Books, 2019.

Joe Maddon, Tom Verducci. The Book of Joe: Trying Not to Suck at Baseball and Life. New York: Hatchette Book Group, 2022.

Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. NYC: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013.